Domestic attempts to use financial incentives for teachers to increase student achievement have been ineffective. In this paper, we demonstrate that exploiting the power of loss aversion-teachers are paid in advance and asked to give back the money if their students do not improve sufficiently-increases math test scores between 0.201 (0.076) and 0.398 (0.129) standard deviations. This is equivalent to increasing teacher quality by more than one standard deviation. A second treatment arm, identical to the loss aversion treatment but implemented in the standard fashion, yields smaller and statistically insignificant results. This suggests it is loss aversion, rather than other features of the design or population sampled, that leads to the stark differences between our findings and past research.
I. Introduction
Good teachers matter. A one-standard deviation improvement in teacher quality translates into annual student achievement gains of 0.15 to 0.24 standard deviations (hereafter σ) in math and 0.15σ to 0.20σ in reading (Rockoff, 2004; Rivkin et al, 2005; Aaronson et al., 2007; Kane and Staiger, 2008) . These effects are comparable to reducing class size by about one-third (Krueger, 1999) . Similarly, Chetty et al. (2012) estimate that, a one-standard deviation increase in teacher quality in a single grade increases earnings by about 1% per year; students assigned to these teachers are also more likely to attend college and save for retirement, and less likely to have children when teenagers.
It has proven difficult, however, to identify ex ante the most productive teachers.
Observable characteristics such as college-entrance test scores, grade point averages, or major choice are not highly correlated with teacher value-added on standardized test scores (Aaronson et al., 2007; Rivkin et al., 2005; Kane and Staiger, 2008; Rockoff et al., 2008) . And, programs that aim to make teachers more effective have shown little impact on teacher quality (see e.g., Boyd et al 2007 for a review). Some argue that these two facts, coupled with the inherent challenges in removing low performing teachers due to collective bargaining agreements and increased job market opportunities for women, contributes to the fact that teacher quality and aptitude has declined significantly in the past 40 years (Corcoran et al., 2004; Hoxby and Leigh, 2004) . 1 To increase teacher productivity, there is growing enthusiasm among policy makers for initiatives that tie teacher incentives to the achievement of their students. At least ten states and many more school districts have implemented teacher incentive programs in an effort to increase student achievement (Fryer forthcoming) .
2 Yet, the 1 Corcoran et al. (2004) find that in the 1964-1971 period, 20-25 percent of new female teachers were ranked in the top 10 percent of their high school cohort, while in 2000, less than 13 percent were ranked at the top decile. Hoxby and Leigh (2004) similarly find that the share of teachers in the highest aptitude category fell from 5 percent in 1963 to 1 percent in 2000 and the share in the lowest aptitude category rose from 16 percent to 36 percent in the same period. 2 Merit pay faces opposition from the two major unions: The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and the National Education Association (NEA). Though in favor of reforming teacher compensation systems, the AFT and the NEA officially object to programs that reward teachers based on student test scores and principal evaluations, while favoring instead systems that reward teachers based on additional roles and responsibilities they take within the school or certifications and qualifications they accrue. The AFT's official position cites the past underfunding of such programs, the confusing metrics by which teachers empirical evidence on the effectiveness of such programs is ambivalent. In developing countries where the degree of teacher professionalism is extremely low and absenteeism is rampant, field experiments that link pay to teacher performance are associated with substantial improvements in student test scores (Duflo et al. (forthcoming) ; Glewwe et al. 2010; Muralidharan and Sundararaman (forthcoming) ). On the other hand, the only two field experiments conducted in the United States have shown small, if not negative, treatment effects (Springer et al. 2010, Fryer (forthcoming) ).
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In this paper, we implement the first field experiment on teacher incentives (and one of the only field experiments in any domain) that exploits the power of framing in the presence of loss aversion. A large literature on reference dependent preferences demonstrates behavior consistent with a notion of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) . 4 Lab experiments have consistently demonstrated that subjects are more responsive to protocols framed as losses than to protocols framed as gains. Until recently, however, these findings have been largely confined to the lab.
Only one previous field study has tested loss aversion in the context of incentive pay, finding that bonuses framed as losses improve productivity of teams in a Chinese factory (Hossain and List 2009). 5 During the 2010-2011 school year we conducted an experiment in nine schools in Chicago Heights, IL. At the beginning of the school year teachers were randomly selected to participate in a pay-for-performance program. Among those who were were evaluated, and the crude binary reward system in which there is no gradation of merit as the reasons for its objection. The NEA's official position maintains that any alterations in compensation should be bargained at the local level, and that a singular salary scale and a strong base salary should be the standard for compensation. 3 Non-experimental analyses of teacher incentive programs in the United States have also shown no measurable success, though one should interpret these data with caution due to the lack of credible causal estimates (Glazerman et al., 2009; Vigdor, 2008) 4 Examples in this literature include behavioral anomalies such as the endowment effect (Thaler, 1980) , status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) , and observed divergences of willingness to pay and willingness to accept measures of value (Haneman, 1991) . 5 Previous field experiments have tested the effect of the loss frame in marketing messages on product demand (Ganzach and Karsahi 1995, Bertrand et al 2010) . In the context of education, two studies run concurrently to ours find that framing student incentives as losses improves short-term test performance (Levitt et al., 2012) , but does not affect children's food choice (List and Savikhin, 2012) . All of these studies frame incentives as losses through messaging rather than actual endowments. In this paper we test a much stronger treatment, endowing teachers for a full school year with payments worth about 8% of the average teacher's salary.
selected the timing and framing of the reward payment varied significantly. One set of teachers -whom we label the "Gain" treatment -received "traditional" financial incentives in the form of bonuses at the end of the year linked to student achievement.
Other teachers -the "Loss" treatment -were given a lump sum payment at the beginning of the school year and informed that they would have to return some or all of it if their students did not meet performance targets. Importantly, teachers in the "Gain" and "Loss" groups with the same performance received the same final bonus.
Within the "Loss" and "Gain" groups we additionally test whether there are heterogeneous effects for individual rewards compared to team rewards. In all groups, we incentivized performance according to the "pay for percentile" method developed by Barlevy and Neal (2011) , in which teachers are rewarded according to how highly their students' test score improvement ranks among peers with similar baseline achievement and demographic characteristics.
The results of our experiment are consistent with over 30 years of psychological and economic research on the power of loss aversion to motivate individual behavior.
Students whose teachers were in the "Loss" treatment show large and statistically significant gains between 0.201σ (0.076) and 0.398σ (0.129) standard deviations in math test scores. 6 In line with previous studies in the United States, we do not find an impact of teacher incentives that are framed as gains. The difference between the "Loss" and "Gain" treatments in math improvement is statistically significant.
We conclude our statistical analysis with three additional robustness checks to our interpretation of the data. First, we investigate the extent to which attrition out of sample may explain our results. We find little evidence suggesting that students in either treatment type are more likely to attrite. Second, analyzing a survey we administered to 6 Our agreement with the Chicago Heights teachers union required us to offer every teacher the opportunity to participate in the incentive program, including Social Studies teachers, Language Arts teachers, and interventionists. Since the district only administers Math, Reading, and Science tests (the last only in 4 th and 7 th grade), we allowed Social Studies teachers, Language Arts teachers, and reading interventionists to earn rewards based on their students' performance on the Reading examination. In other words, a student's reading performance often determined the rewards of multiple teachers, who were potentially assigned to different treatment groups. While this structure created some confusion among teachers and likely contaminated our Reading results, it allowed us to preserve a rigorous experimental design for our math treatments. In the interest of full disclosure, we present results for reading tests in the Appendix, but our discussion will focus primarily on the impacts of the various treatments on math performance. We discuss these issues in more detail in Section 4. all treatment and control teachers suggests that alternative explanations such as alleviating teacher liquidity constraints are not likely to explain the patterns in our data. If anything, teachers in the loss treatment report spending less money on classroom materials. Third, we consider whether our results could be driven by cheating, but believe this hypothesis to be unlikely since we find very similar results on nonincentivized statewide exams.
Together, this suggests that the divergence in our findings from previous results is due to the addition of framing in the incentive design -rather than differences in settings, reward structure or implementation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review. Section 3 details the experiment and its implementation. Section 4 describes the data and research design used in the analysis. Section 5 presents estimates of the impact of teacher incentives on student achievement. Section 6 describes potential threats to our interpretation. The final section concludes. There is an online data appendix that provides details on how we construct our covariates and our sample from the school district administrative files used in our analysis.
II. A Brief Review of the Literature
The theory underlying teacher incentives programs is straightforward: if teachers lack motivation to put effort into important inputs to the education production function (e.g. lesson planning, parental engagement), financial incentives tied to student achievement may have a positive impact by motivating teachers to increase their effort.
There are a number of reasons, however, why teacher incentives may fail to operate in the desired manner. For instance, teachers may not know how to increase student achievement, the production function may have important complementarities outside their control, or the incentives may be either too confusing or too weak to induce extra effort. Moreover, if teacher incentives have unintended consequences such as explicit cheating, teaching to the test, or focusing on specific, tested objectives at the expense of more general learning, teacher incentives could have a negative impact on student performance (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Jacob and Levitt, 2003) . Others argue that teacher incentives can decrease a teacher's intrinsic motivation or lead to harmful competition between teachers in what some believe to be a collaborative environment (Johnson, 1984; Firestone and Pennell, 1993) .
Despite the controversy, there is a growing literature on the role of teacher incentives on student performance (Glazerman et al., 2009; Glewwe et al., 2010; Lavy, 2002; Lavy, 2009; Muralidharan and Sundararaman, forthcoming; Fryer forthcoming, Springer et al., 2010; Vigdor, 2008.) , including an emerging literature on the optimal design of such incentives (Neal 2011). To date, there are five papers, three of them outside the US, which provide experimental estimates of the causal impact of teacher incentives on student achievement: Duflo and Hanna (2005) , Glewwe et al. (2010) , Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011), Fryer (forthcoming) and Springer et al. (2010) . Evidence from Developing Countries Duflo and Hanna (2005) randomly sampled 60 schools in rural India and provided them with financial incentives to reduce absenteeism. The incentive scheme was simple; teachers' pay was linear in their attendance, at the rate of Rs 50 per day, after the first 10 days of each month. They found that teacher absence rate was significantly lower in treatment schools (22 percent) compared to control schools (42 percent) and that student achievement in treatment schools was 0.17 (0.09) higher than in control schools. Glewwe et al. (2010) report results from a randomized evaluation that provided 4th through 8th grade teachers in Kenya with group incentives based on test scores and find that while test scores increased in program schools in the short run, students did not retain the gains after the incentive program ended. They interpret these results as being consistent with teachers expending effort towards short-term increases in test scores but not towards long-term learning.
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) investigate the effect of individual and group incentives in 300 schools in Andhra Pradesh, India and find that group and individual incentives increased student achievement by 0.165σ (.042) after one year.
While the effects of the group incentive and the individual incentive treatments are very similar in year one, they diverge in the second year. Two-year effects are 0.283σ (.058) and 0.154 σ (0.057) for the individual and group treatments, respectively. New York City public schools, which distributed a total of roughly $75 million to over 20,000 teachers. Each participating school could earn $3,000 for every union-represented staff member, which the school could distribute at its own discretion, if the school met the annual performance target set by the Department of Education based on school report card scores. Each participating school was given $1,500 per union staff member if it met at least 75% of the target, but not the full target. Each school had the power to decide whether all of the rewards would be given to a small subset of teachers with the highest value-added, whether the winners of the rewards would be decided by lottery, or virtually anything in-between. The only restriction was that schools were not allowed to distribute rewards based on job seniority. Yet, despite this apparent flexibility, the vast majority of schools chose to distribute the rewards evenly, and there was no effect on student achievement or teacher behavior. If anything, there was a negative impact, especially in larger schools where free-riding may have been problematic.
Evidence from Experiments in America
Our contribution is three-fold. First, this paper is the first experimental study to demonstrate that teacher merit pay can have a significant impact on student performance 7 There are several non-experimental evaluations of teacher incentive programs in the US, all of which report non-significant impact of the program on student achievement. Glazerman et al. (2009) in the U.S. Second, we show that these findings differ from previous studies as a result of incorporating insights from behavioral economics into the incentive design. Third, this is the first study to test loss aversion using high stakes endowments in the field.
Moreover, we contribute to a small but growing literature that uses randomized field experiments to test incentive pay in organizations Rasul 2007, Hossain and List 2009 ).
III. Program Details Background
The city of Chicago Heights is located thirty miles south of Chicago. The district contains nine K-8 schools with a total of approximately 3,200 students. Like larger urban school districts, Chicago Heights is made up of primarily low-income minority students who struggle with low achievement rates-in the year prior to our program, 64% of students met the minimum standard on the Illinois State Achievement Test (ISAT) compared to 81% of students statewide. Roughly 98% of the elementary and middle school students in our sample are eligible for free or reduced-price lunch.
In cooperation with the Chicago Heights superintendent and Chicago Heights
Teachers Union, the implementation of our field experiment followed standard protocols.
As part of our agreement with the Teachers Union to conduct an experiment with teacher incentives, program participation was made available to every K-8 classroom teacher, as well as reading and math interventionists. 8 Approximately 160 teachers were eligible to participate in the experiment. After we introduced the program at the district-wide
Teacher Institute Day at the start of the 2010-11 school year, teachers had until the end of September to opt-in to the program; 150 teachers (93.75%) elected to participate. 9 We calculate rewards using the "pay for percentile" methodology developed by Barlevy and Neal (2011) . At baseline, we place each student in a bin with his nine nearest neighbors in terms of pre-program test performance. 10 We then rank each student within his bin according to improvement between his baseline and end of the year test score. Each teacher receives an "overall percentile", which is the average of all her students' percentile ranks within their bins.
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Teachers receive $80 per percentile for a maximum possible reward of $8,000. The expected value of the reward ($4,000) is equivalent to approximately 8% of the average teacher salary in Chicago Heights.
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Random Assignment
Before any randomization occurs, we paired all teachers in each school with their closest match by grade, subject(s), and students taught. From there, the randomization procedure is straightforward for "contained" teachers -i.e. those who teach the same homeroom for the entire day. These teachers are randomly assigned to one of the four treatments, or the control group, subject to the restriction that teachers in the "team treatments" must be in the same treatment group as his/her teammate. 9 The results of ISAT are used to determine whether schools are meeting yearly targets under the No Child Left Behind law. The ThinkLink is administered to 3 rd -8 th grade students four times a year in September, November, January and May. K-2 students took the test in May only. Each subject test lasts 30-60 minutes and is either taken on the computer (3 rd -8 th grade students at all but one school) or on paper (all K-2 students and 3 rd -8 th grade students at one school). All students are tested in math and reading. In addition, 4 th and 7 th grade students take a science test as they do on ISAT. We proctored all end of the year testing in order to ensure consistency and discourage cheating. 10 We construct a predicted baseline (fall 2010) test score based on up to three years of prior test score data. For students without prior year test scores, we use their actual fall 2010 score as their baseline score (fall testing was completed before the program began). Students are placed in separate bins for each subject. In order to avoid competition among teachers (or students) in the same school, students are never placed in a bin with students from the same school. 11 We rewarded teachers of contained classrooms based on the performance of their homeroom on both reading and math (and science in 4 th and 7 th grades only). We rewarded teachers of rotating classrooms on a subset of the homeroom-subjects they taught. 12 At the end of the year we rounded up students' percentiles to 100%, 90%, 80% . . . .20%, 10%, so that the average percentile was 55% (rather than 50%) and the average reward was $4,400 (rather than $4,000). Teachers were not informed of this in advance.
Teachers who teach multiple homerooms are subject to a slightly different procedure. Their students are grouped by class and subject and randomized into one of the five groups. As a result, a teacher can receive incentives based on the performance of some of her classes taught throughout the day and no incentives for others. In our main specifications, the students whose performance does not determine a teacher's reward are included in the control group.
This aspect of our design allows us to examine the role of spillovers in our incentive scheme. If teaching production has significant fixed costs, we might expect that students in the control group whose teacher is incentivized for other students' performance would benefit from the treatment. For instance, if a teacher teaches both a treated and a control math class, the added incentive to prepare an effective lesson for the treated class might result in a better lesson for control students.
One difficulty with the research design is that our agreement with the Chicago Heights Teachers Union required us to offer the incentive program to all elementary and middle school teachers who signed up to participate. This presents few complications in math; students typically have only one math teacher, so there is a nearly one-to-one mapping between teachers and students. However, since the district does not administer exams in Social Studies, we offered incentives to these teachers based on their students' performance on the Reading exam. 13 Moreover, students with an Individualized Education Plan (IEP)-roughly 11% of the sample-also receive additional reading instruction from a reading specialist. Thus, more than one-third of the students in the sample have reading teachers in different treatments. Because of the confusion this likely induced among reading teachers and the difficulties that arise in the statistical analysis due to contamination and lack of power, we focus our discussion on the math results in what follows. Results for reading can be found in Appendix Tables 1 and 2. 14 Our randomization procedure is straightforward. To improve balance among the control group and the four treatment arms, over a pure random draw, we re-randomized teachers after the initial draw. First, we calculated a balance statistic for the initial 13 At the request of the district, we also based incentives for Language Arts and Writing teachers based on student performance on the Reading exam. 14 We also incentivized 4 th and 7 th grade science, which are tested on the statewide exam. However, the sample sizes were too small to conduct a meaningful statistical analysis. assignments, defined as the sum of the inverse p-values from tests of balance across all five groups. 15 Our algorithm then searches for teachers to "swap" until it finds a switch that does not violate any of the rules outlined above. If switching these teachers' treatments would improve the balance statistic, the switch is made; otherwise it is ignored. The algorithm continues until it has tested forty potential swaps.
There is an active discussion on which randomization procedures have the best
properties. Treasure and MacRae (1998) prefer a method similar to the ones described above. Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) 
Implementation
Teachers assigned to one of the two "Gain" treatments received their rewards at the end of the year, much like all previous programs have done (Springer et al. 2010; Fryer (forthcoming) ). In the "Loss" treatment, however, the timing changes significantly.
Teachers in these treatment arms received $4,000 (i.e., the expected value of the reward)
at the beginning of the year. 16 Teachers in the "Loss" treatment signed a contract stating that if their students' end of the year performance was below average, they would return the difference between $4,000 and their final reward. 17 If their students' performance was above average, we issued the teacher an additional payment of up to $4,000 for a total of up to $8,000. Thus, "Gain" and "Loss" teachers received identical net payments for a given level of performance. The only difference is the timing and framing of the rewards. 15 We use chi-squared tests to test for balance across categorical variables (school and subject) and ranksum tests for continuous variables (baseline ThinkLink math score, baseline ThinkLink reading score, contact minutes with teacher, percent black, percent Hispanic, percent female and grade). 16 For tax reasons, some teachers requested that we issue the upfront payment in 2011. About half of teachers received the loss reward at the beginning of January 2011. 17 We received back 98% of the payments owed at the end of the year.
Within the "Gain" and "Loss" groups, teachers were also randomly assigned to receive either individual or team rewards. Teachers in the individual treatment groups received rewards based on the performance of their own students. The team treatment paired teachers in a school who were closely matched by grade and subject(s) taught.
These teachers received rewards based on their average team performance. For example, if teacher A's overall percentile is 60% and teacher B's overall percentile is 40%, then their team average is 50% and each teacher receives $4,000.
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The study formally commenced at the end of September 2010 after baseline testing was completed. Informational meetings for each of the incentive groups were held in October 2010, at which time the incentivized compensation was explained in detail to the teachers. Midway through the experiment, we provided incentivized teachers with an interim report summarizing their students' performance on a midyear assessment test (the results were for informational use only and did not affect teachers' final reward).
We also surveyed all participating teachers about their time use, collaboration with fellow teachers and knowledge about the rewards program.
IV. Data and Research Design Data
We merged administrative data from the Chicago Heights school district with survey data from the teachers in the experiment. The administrative data include: teacher assignments, gender, race, eligibility for free or reduced price lunch, eligibility for percent are members of a minority group.
Econometric Approach
To estimate the causal impact of providing teacher incentives on outcomes, we estimate intent-to-treat (ITT) effects, i.e., differences between treatment and control group means. Let GainTreat h and LossTreat h be indicators for starting the year in a homeroom assigned to the Gain or Loss treatment, respectively. Furthermore, let X i be a vector of baseline covariates measured at the individual level that includes all the variables summarized in Table 2 . The individual level covariates, X i , a set of school fixed-effects, γ s , and set of grade fixed effects, μ g , comprise our parsimonious set of controls. All these variables are measured pre-treatment, and the school and grade effects reflect a students' enrollment at the beginning of the school year.
The ITT effects, π G and π L , are estimated from the equation below:
, where h indexes homerooms (the unit of randomization), i students, g grades, and s schools.
19 Table 2 excludes students exposed to multiple treatments. These students are included in the regression results.
Recall, given our design, it is possible that a student has two or more teachers that face different incentive treatments within the same subject area. Because we focus on math teachers, this inconvenience is easily overcome; students have at most two math teachers and 99% of the students in our sample see a single math teacher. For students with one math teacher, the treatment variable is dichotomous and we estimate a traditional intent-to-treat regression. In the 1% of cases in which a student has two math teachers who are in different treatments, we assign her a value of 0.5 for GainTreat and
LossTreat. Correspondingly, if one teacher is in control and one is in treatment, the relevant treatment variable takes on a value of 0.5. Dropping all students exposed to multiple teachers yields qualitatively identical results.
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V. Results Table 3 presents ITT estimates of the effect of teacher incentives on math achievement measured by the May 2011 ThinkLink exam, the test used in determining teacher incentive compensation in our study. We present estimated treatment effects in both standard deviation units and percentile ranks within groups of nine nearest neighbors -precisely the metric on which the rewards were calculated. The top three rows correspond to the "Loss" treatments, including the pooled loss results as well as the "Individual Loss" and "Team Loss" results separately. The bottom three rows present parallel results for the "Gain" treatments. Standard errors, clustered at the homeroom level, are presented in parentheses below each estimate.
Columns (1) and (4) include only a baseline test score as a control. Columns (2) and (5) add the remaining student-level variables in Table 2 as controls; their inclusion has almost no effect on our estimates. In columns (3) and (6), we include only treated and "pure control" students in the regression sample. In these specifications, we drop students whose teacher receives rewards based on other students' performance, but not these particular students. If our treatments create positive (resp. negative) spillovers onto 20 The situation is significantly more complex for reading, where one-third of our sample is exposed to teachers in different treatment arms.
these students, we would expect these estimates to be higher (resp. lower) than those in columns (2) and (5).
We Similar tables for Reading can be found in the Appendix; Appendix Table 1 reports results for ThinkLink, and Appendix Table 2 reports ISAT and ITBS estimates.
Just as in Math, the Team Loss treatment seems to have the strongest effects on reading scores, though the effects disappear when combined with the negative Individual Loss effects in the pooled specifications. The spillover-adjusted estimates are also higher than the unadjusted estimates in all regressions. While large standard errors prevent definitive conclusions, we view this as further suggestive evidence that our treatments had beneficial effects for students in certain control classrooms.
To investigate the heterogeneity of the program's effects, 
VI. Interpretation
The results presented thus far suggest that loss aversion can play an important role in amplifying the power of teacher incentives. When we offer teachers performance rewards paid at the end of the year, we replicate the null findings in Springer et al. (2010) and Fryer (forthcoming) . However, when we provide an advance on the payment and reframe the incentive as avoidance of a loss, we observe treatment effects in excess of 0.201 and some as high as 0.398 -similar to the increase in student achievement associated with a more than one standard deviation increase in teacher quality. In all of our specifications, we can reject the null hypothesis of equal effects in the Loss and Gain treatments with 95% confidence.
In this section we identify and respond to three potential threats to our interpretation: the influence of attrition, the use of cash-in-advance to change the education production function, and the potential for cheating.
Attrition
It is possible that teachers in the loss treatment resorted to means other than teaching to increase their rewards. One might worry that they found ways to discourage their weaker students from taking exams, for instance. Our incentive structure complicates this strategy to some extent, at least, as rewards are based on a student performance relative to other students with similar baseline scores and demographic profiles. However, teachers could potentially weed out students who have made relatively less progress during the year.
To investigate the prevalence of attrition in our sample, we run a probit regression on all of our covariates where the dependent variable is an indicator for missing any of the exams we consider. were not directly incentivized, it seems unlikely that attrition is driving our results.
Liquidity Constraints
Suppose that teachers are able to purchase certain materials that facilitate instruction such as new workbooks or dry-erase markers. Incentivizing student achievement creates an additional incentive to make these investments, provided that the gains (and the associated rewards) are large enough to justify the expense. Under perfect credit markets, we would not expect any difference in effects between our gain and loss treatments. Teachers in the loss group could use their upfront check if necessary, and cash-strapped teachers in the gain treatments could borrow money to finance their purchases.
If teachers are liquidity-constrained, however, the loss treatment effectively gives them access to a form of financing unavailable to teachers in the gain treatment. It is possible that this mechanism could create the effects that we observe.
Survey evidence, however, suggests that this explanation is unlikely. Table 7 reports treatment effect estimates on several survey outcomes. When asked how much of their personal money they spent on classroom materials that year, teachers in the loss group reported spending less than teachers in the gain treatment or the control group (though the difference is not statistically significant). What's more, 69% of teachers in the loss treatment report that they had not spent any money from their check when they were surveyed in March 2011 (three quarters of the way through the experiment).
Cheating
Finally, one might naturally worry that tying bonuses to test scores might induce certain teachers to cheat. Indeed, Jacob and Levitt (2003) find an uptick in estimated cheating after Chicago Public Schools instituted a performance-bonus system.
We find this explanation uncompelling, however, primarily because the results on the state tests -for which teachers received no rewards under our scheme and for which the entire school was under pressure to perform -mirror the ThinkLink results. It seems unlikely that the pattern would repeat itself on the ITBS and ISAT tests if differential cheating practices across treatment and control groups were driving our results.
VII. Conclusion
In this study, we present evidence that framing a teacher incentive program in terms of losses rather than gains leads to improved student outcomes. The impacts we observe are large -roughly the same order of magnitude as increasing average teacher quality by more than one standard deviation. Our findings have implications not only within education, but more broadly. While there is overwhelming laboratory evidence for loss aversion, there have been few prior field experimental demonstrations of this phenomenon.
Our results, along with those of Hossain and List (2009) suggest that there may be significant potential for exploiting loss aversion in the pursuit of both optimal public policy and the pursuit of profits. Treated teachers earned between $0 and $8,000 in bonus payments based on students' performance relative to nine statistically similar students in one of the other eight schools. Rewards are linear in a student's rank, so the expected value of the reward is $4,000. (2), (3), (5), and (6) add controls for students' race, gender, age, free-lunch status, English proficiency, and special education status. To minimize spillover effects, columns (3) and (6) and drop students whose teachers were rewarded based on the performance of other students in the sample. We also present a p-value on the null hypothesis of equal treatment effects in pooled loss and pooled gain. Standard errors are clustered at the homeroom level throughout. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively. (2), (3), (5), and (6) add controls for students' race, gender, age, free-lunch status, English proficiency, and special education status. To minimize spillover effects, columns (3) and (6) and drop students whose teachers were rewarded based on the performance of other students in the sample. We also present a p-value on the null hypothesis of equal treatment effects in pooled loss and pooled gain. Standard errors are clustered at the homeroom level throughout. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively. Notes: This table presents the increase in the probability of several measures of attrition associated with our gain and loss treatments. The results shown are the marginal effects calculated from a probit regression of the relevant dependent on treatment indicators and our full list of control variables. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the homeroom level. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively. Notes: This table presents results gathered from surveys of teachers in our experimental group at the end of the school year. All coefficients are derived by regression the outcome variable in the first column on a dummy for participation in the Gain or Loss treatment. The sample size for each regression is 82 teachers. Teachers are considered to have participated in either type of treatment if they receive that type of incentive based on any of their students' performance. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively. (5), and (6) add controls for students' race, gender, age, free-lunch status, English proficiency, and special education status. To minimize spillover effects, columns (3) and (6) and drop students whose teachers were rewarded based on the performance of other students in the sample. We also present a p-value on the null hypothesis of equal treatment effects in pooled loss and pooled gain. Standard errors are clustered at the homeroom level throughout. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively. Notes: This table presents estimates of the effectiveness of various teacher incentive structures on ISAT and ITBS reading scores. Results are shown for two outcome measures: a student's percentile rank on an end-of-year test relative to her nine nearest neighbors, and her score on that test normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one within each grade. All regressions include dummy variables for each students' school and grade as well as baseline test scores. Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) add controls for students' race, gender, age, free-lunch status, English proficiency, and special education status. To minimize spillover effects, columns (3) and (6) and drop students whose teachers were rewarded based on the performance of other students in the sample. We also present a p-value on the null hypothesis of equal treatment effects in pooled loss and pooled gain. Standard errors are clustered at the homeroom level throughout. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively.
Appendix

ONLINE APPENDIX -NOT FOR PUBLICATION
A. Variable Construction Attrition For our experiment, we agreed to base teacher rewards on students' performance relative to other students of similar ability. Our experimental sample therefore includes all students for whom we observe enough baseline information to compute a "predicted" score at the time of treatment assignment. In other words, for a student to enter our experimental sample, we must observe either (a) a baseline ThinkLink score from Fall 2010 or (b) a full set of test scores from the pretreatment year. Students in this group for whom we do not observe a final test score are considered attriters.
Students who enter the district in the middle of the year are not included in our sample.
Free and Reduced Price Lunch
We construct an indicator variable set to one if a student meets guidelines for free or reduced price lunch, as determined by District administrative files.
Limited English Proficiency
We set the LEP indicator to one if the District considers a student to be a "Limited English Speaker" or a "Non English Speaker" and zero if the student is a "Fluent English Speaker" or "Native English Speaker."
Race/Ethnicity
We code the race variables such that the five categories -white, black, Hispanic, Asian, and other -are complete and mutually exclusive. Hispanic ethnicity is an absorbing state. Hence "white" implies non-Hispanic white, "black" non-Hispanic black, and so on.
Special Education
We construct an indicator variable for students who receive special instruction according to an Individualized Education Plan, as recorded by the District.
Test Scores
For grades K-8, we observe scaled Math and Reading scores on four ThinkLink examinations taken during the 2010-11 school year (baseline, fall, winter, and spring). Teachers' rewards were determined by their student's performance on the final test, and it is our main outcome variable.
Students also take the Iowa Test of Basic Skills (grades K-2) and the Illinois Standard Achievement Test (grades 3-8). We observe math and reading scores for all grades. Where available, we use scores from the Spring 2010 exams as control variables.
To simplify interpretation, we normalize all scores to have mean zero and standard deviation one by grade, subject, and test. When scores are used as control variables, we leave them unstandardized and use the scale score interacted with the student's grade level.
Treatment Variables
To compute ITT effects, all treatment designations are based on the teacher(s) to which a student is initially assigned. When a student has multiple teachers incentivized on a given test, we assign treatment values according to the dosage assumption described in the text.
